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Abstract 
Appealing to imagination for modal justification is very common. But not everyone 
thinks that all imaginings provide modal justification. Recently, Dominic Gregory (2010) 
and Peter Kung (2010) have independently argued that, whereas imaginings with sensory 
imageries can justify modal beliefs, those without sensory imageries don’t because of 
such imaginings’ extreme liberty. In this essay, I defend the general modal epistemologi-
cal relevance of imagining. I argue, first, that when the objections that target the liberal 
nature of non-sensory imaginings are adequately developed, those objections also threat-
en the sensory imaginings. So, if we think that non-sensory imaginings are too liberal for 
modal justification, we should say the same about sensory imaginings. I’ll finish my de-
fense by showing that, when it comes to deciding between saying that all imaginings are 
prima facie justificatory and saying that no imaginings are justificatory, there is an inde-
pendent reason for accepting the former. 
1 Justifying Modal Beliefs 
 The goal of this essay is to defend the following Yablo-style modal epistemological policy 
against a particular kind of skeptical objection: For any statement S, if z can conceive that S, 
then z is prima facie justified in believing that S is possible. I’ll call this principle Imaginative 
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Conservatism. Following those who defend a similar view,  I take conceiving and imagining to 2
be the same attitude; ‘imagining’ and ‘conceiving’ will be used inter-changeably.  3
 In the recent literature, two kinds of moderate skepticism have been raised against the gen-
eral principle of Imaginative Conservatism. They are moderate in the sense that, instead of ban-
ishing all conceivings from modal epistemology, they argue that some but not all conceivings 
provide modal justification. And these moderate skeptics differ in their ways of distinguishing 
the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’ conceivings. 
 The first kind of moderate skeptic distinguishes the good conceivings from the bad ones 
based on the subject matter of those conceivings. It says that only conceivings about mundane 
facts can justify beliefs about possibilities; conceivings about facts distant from our everyday life 
cannot. I call this Type-1 moderate skepticism (van Inwagen 1997; Hawke 2011). 
 The second kind separates the good ones from the bad ones, roughly speaking, based not on 
the subject matter of the conceivings but on the manner in which the conceiving is done. Very 
roughly put, they distinguish sensory conceivings from the non-sensory ones, and argue that the 
non-sensory conceivings don’t provide even prima facie justification for claims about possibili-
ties. I call this Type-2 moderate skepticism (Gregory 2010; Kung 2010). 
 Arguments for Type-1 moderate skepticism offered by van Inwagen and Hawke have been 
effectively addressed by Geirsson (2005) and Hartl (2016). So I won’t try to reinvent the wheel 
here. Instead, I’ll focus on defending the general epistemic relevance of conceivings against ar-
guments for Type-2 moderate skepticism. 
 Type-2 skepticism can come in slightly different forms. But one feature unites them: they all 
find conceivings that are not based on the sensory too liberal to have any justificatory value. 
There hasn’t been a focused response to the Type-2 skeptical worry yet. In this essay, I will offer 
one. My main goal is not to prove Imaginative Conservatism, but to argue that arguments against 
it from the Type-2 skeptics are not effective. I’ll thereby show that there is no good reason to 
think that our imagination, sensory or not, is too liberal for modal epistemology. 
 This kind of conceivability-based modal epistemology is defended by Yablo in ‘Is Conceivability a 2
Guide to Possibility?’ (1993) and is further developed by Geirsson (2005). Williamson (2007) is difficult 
to classify. Although he argues that we have access to modal truths only via learning about counterfactu-
als, according to his view, it is via imaginings that we learn about counterfactual truths. So, there is an 
indirect sense in which Williamson’s view is also conceivability-based. It is worth noting that Imaginative 
Conservatism is a very weak claim. It does not rule out other sources of modal justification. Imagining is 
just a sufficient condition for prima facie modal justification, not a necessary condition. So, for example, 
Roca-Royes’s (2011) objection against conceivability-based modal epistemology does not work against 
Imaginative Conservatism.
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 Type-2 moderate skepticism is defended in slightly different ways by Gregory (2010) and 
Kung (2010).  By contrasting their efforts, an assumption indispensable to their skeptical argu4 -
ments will be brought to light. I’ll argue that this assumption makes the moderate position sought 
by the Type-2 moderate skeptics highly unstable. I’ll then complete my defense by casting doubt 
on the plausibility of embracing a more radical skepticism that denies the modal epistemological 
value of not just the non-sensory imaginings, but all imaginings. 
2 Gregory’s Argument 
 Suppose that I imagine Teddy eating a blue tomato by visualization. Such an imagining in-
volves sensory qualities, e.g., the imagined visual experience of blue. But the imagining involves 
not just those sensory features but also a conceptual interpretation of the imagery, e.g., a portion 
of the sensory image is labeled as Teddy. Such a conceptual interpretation is called an assign-
ment.  5
 An imagining that consists of both imageries and assignments is an imagistic imagining. 
There are non-imagistic imaginings, too. I can imagine that water molecules are composed of 
four hydrogen atoms and two oxygen atoms. I can also imagine that space has five instead of 
three dimensions. Such imaginings don’t involve any sensory imagery; I didn’t and couldn’t vi-
sualize a five-dimensional space. Such imaginings have assignments without sensory imagery. 
 Gregory believes that the imagining of p can be a rational guide to the belief that p is possi-
ble only when the imagining of p makes p appear possible. Non-imagistic imaginings, according 
to him, do not make anything appear possible. Therefore, non-imagistic imaginings do not even 
provide defeasible prima facie justification for possibilities. They have no modal epistemological 
value, unlike imagistic imaginings, which offer prima facie justification for possibilities by mak-
ing things appear possible. 
 The question is, why does Gregory think that the non-imagistic imagining that p does not 
make p appear possible? In his own words: 
Reconsider, first, our [A]-imaginings [i.e. sensory imaginings]. If we were to accept that 
we cannot have sensations of the type specified in [A], we would view our [A]-imagin-
ings as having misinformed us about our sensory capacities; in that respect, our imagina-
tions would have generated illusions. But if we were to accept that universes can only 
have finitely many stars, we wouldn’t similarly regard our [B]-imaginings [i.e. non-imag-
istic imaginings] as misinforming us about what’s possible—our [B]-imaginings 
wouldn’t themselves have had an illusory character. (2010: 329) 
Gregory’s argument seems to be that, if non-sensory imagining of p makes p appear possible, 
then we would find the non-sensory imagining illusory and misleading if p turns out to be impos-
 I would like to thank Ross Cameron for pointing me to Gregory’s work.4
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nology here because his framework for describing the different components in an imagining is developed 
in more detail.
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sible. However, Gregory thinks that we would not find our non-sensory imagining of p misin-
forming even if it turns out that p is not possible. Therefore, he concludes that non-sensory imag-
inings do not make things appear possible in the first place. 
 It seems pretty clear to me that, if I conceive of p in a non-imagistic way but it turns out that 
p is not possible, I would consider my non-imagistic conceiving misleading. Before learning 
about Russell’s paradox, I found a set of all the things that do not contain themselves as member 
conceivable. And that non-imagistic conceiving led me to think that a set of all the things that do 
not contain themselves as a member is possible. Once I learned about the paradox, I realized that 
my original conceiving was misleading, indicating that the conceiving did make the set seem 
possible to me. I was misled by my imagining. Thus, Gregory’s argument against non-sensory 
imaginings is based on a very questionable premise, one that is not evident enough to be the ba-
sis of a compelling argument for thinking that non-imagistic conceivings don’t make things ap-
pear possible. 
 Gregory goes on to say: 
In particular, our imaginative imposition of non-imagistic constraints is like mere suppo-
sition and mere labelling in the following respect: our having imposed the constraints 
doesn’t generally make their satisfaction appear possible, no more than mere supposi-
tions and mere labellings typically produce appearances of possibility. In that sense, 
nothing generally ‘follows from’ a nonimagistic imagining concerning the possibility of 
its objects. (2010: 330) 
This remark should not be read as an attempt to argue that, first, our non-imagistic imaginings 
are like suppositions, and second, our suppositions do not make what is supposed appear possi-
ble, therefore our non-imagistic imaginings do not make the imagined appear possible too. The 
remark cannot be read this way because there is an important difference between our non-imagis-
tic imaginings and our suppositions: There are things that we can suppose but cannot imagine (in 
a non-imagistic way). 
 We suppose things that are plainly contradictory for the sake of reductio all the time — or 
just for the sake of it. Plain contradictions are inconceivable. Say I grant that some impossibili-
ties can be imagined. (See Kung 2010: 626, also footnote 8 below.) But not all impossibilities are 
plain contradictions: it is not contradictory that water is XYZ, even though it is necessarily false. 
I’m also ready to concede that contradictions are also conceivable as long as they are well con-
cealed. But plain contradictions like an apple’s being both red and not red are inconceivable.  If 6
the range of non-imagistic imagination and the range of supposition are not the same, we cannot 
 Geirsson (2005) makes a similar point about the inconceivability of contradiction. But I disagree with 6
him when he says that this is due to the fact that we cannot understand contradiction. Non-sensory con-
ceiving should not be identified with understanding. And that is exactly because we do understand contra-
diction; otherwise, we wouldn’t be able to understand a reductio argument. (See also Yablo (1993) for a 
similar point.) Here I am not arguing that plain contradiction is inconceivable; I am stating as an intro-
spective fact about our propositional attitudes that I cannot conceive of contradictions.
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argue that non-imagistic imagination does not make things appear possible simply because sup-
position doesn’t.  7
 More importantly, even Gregory acknowledges the difference: 
The range of things which we are capable of supposing outruns the range of things which 
we are typically happy to regard as imaginable. For instance, we can suppose that explicit 
contradictions hold, but more people deny being able to imagine explicit contradictions. I 
have no idea why this discrepancy exists. (2010: 330, footnote 26) 
So he admits that ‘more people’ are inclined to draw a distinction between supposing and imag-
ining when it comes to explicit contradiction. That alone should make it dialectically problematic 
for one to argue that imaginings have no modal epistemological value simply because suppos-
ings don’t. Such a move is questionable even if Gregory himself appears to have reservations 
about the discrepancy. After all, although people’s self-reports about their mental states are falli-
ble, they should be taken seriously. As long as Gregory does not give us a compelling reason to 
think that the majority are wrong about their own mental states in this regard, such self-reports 
should be taken at face value. 
 It is due to this discrepancy that Gregory needs to qualify the alleged similarity between our 
non-imagistic imaginings and our suppositions in the follow way: they are similar in the sense 
that they both do not make things appear possible. But, of course, if this is the way to spell out 
the intended similarity between our non-imagistic imaginings and our suppositions, we cannot 
rely on this similarity to argue that our non-imagistic imaginings do not generate the appearance 
of possibilities without begging the question. 
 The comparison with supposition shouldn’t be read as an argument for skepticism against 
the justificatory value of non-imagistic imaginings. However, the fact that Gregory made that 
comparison in the first place gives us some hint about what exactly about the non-imagistic 
imaginings that inspires his suspicion that non-imagistic imaginings do not produce appearances 
of possibilities. It seems to me that the suspicion stems from the fact that, just like our power of 
forming supposition, our power of non-imagistic imagination is very liberal. 
 But this suspicion alone doesn’t yet give us any compelling argument against appealing to 
non-imagistic imagination in our modal epistemology. The world could have been wildly differ-
ent in numerous ways. If so, it’s simply to be expected that, whatever capacity we can rely on to 
form a broad range of justified modal beliefs, that capacity is meant to be very liberal in granting 
 This is a reason to reject Currie & Ravenscroft's (2002) view that non-sensory imagination/conceiving 7
just is assuming (9). Similarly, Ichikawa & Jarvis (2012) defend the view that non-sensory imagination 
just is some kind of supposing. But to avoid the kind of worry I raise here, they add that imagining that p 
is supposing that p and finding no absurdity among p’s immediate logical consequences. Adding the bit 
about no immediate logical absurdity is to avoid the imagining of the plain inconsistencies, which can be 
supposed as I pointed out. Technically, that extra bit can do the job. I have my concerns about Ichikawa & 
Jarvis’ approach, but addressing that is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will just point out that, 
by adding that extra restriction on imagining, we are already admitting that imagining is more restrictive 
than supposing and hence one can’t directly infer from what supposing can’t justify to what imagining 
can’t justify. (That is not what Ichikawa & Jarvis does.)
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possibilities. Thus, simply pointing out that our non-imagistic imagination is very liberal doesn’t 
say much against non-imagistic imagination’s modal epistemological value. 
 To build a case against non-imagistic imaginings, much more has to be said about the liberal 
nature of those imaginings — not just that they are very liberal, but in what sense they are too 
liberal to have modal epistemological value. Gregory fails to offer any explanation as to why 
they are too liberal to make things appear possible. Without such an explanation, we do not yet 
have a compelling skeptical argument. This is where Kung has more to offer. 
3 Kung’s Argument 
 Kung’s (2010) project is meant to be anti-skeptical. It is an attempt to resist radical skepti-
cism about the modal epistemological value of imaginings. He observes that we can imagine im-
possibilities. He takes this to show that our imagination is an unreliable source of modal justifi-
cation. We should not rely on imagination for modal justification unless we can show that (i) 
there is a sub-category of imaginings that do not provide modal justification for a principled rea-
son and that (ii) all imaginings of impossibilities happen to fall neatly into this sub-category. By 
showing that, the imaginings of impossibilities would be ‘quarantined’ and prevented from 
threatening our appeal to other imaginings for modal justification. And Kung argues that non-
sensory imaginings is the sub-category we need. (Kung’s ‘non-sensory imagining’ is, roughly 
speaking, Gregory’s ‘non-imagistic imagining.’) 
 Kung’s anti-skeptical project is ill-motivated. Let us grant him that we can imagine impossi-
bilities. (Otherwise, there is no issue about reliability to begin with.)  But still, that alone doesn’t 8
show that imaginings are unreliable. For most advocates of conceivability-based modal episte-
mology, imaginings are meant to be a fallible guide to possibilities. So surely there are impossi-
bilities that we can imagine. That does not mean our imagination is unreliable. It would not help 
to say that we can imagine impossibilities ‘very easily’ (Kung 2010: 633), for ‘reliability’ is a 
statistical notion, not a notion about how much psychological effort we have to put into imagin-
ing impossibilities. Since I can imagine a vast number of things that are unquestionably possible, 
it remains far from obvious that imaginings are indeed unreliable. 
 Setting the concern about Kung’s anti-skeptical project aside, what we want to focus on is 
the skeptical aspect of his work: the part where he says that there is independent reason for think-
 Here I am just playing along with Kung’s claim that we can imagine impossibilities. Kripke famously 8
disagrees. He thinks that cases where we seem to conceive of something impossible are deceptive (e.g., 
we are not really conceiving that Hesperus is not identical to Phosphorus when we appear to do so). Al-
though Kripke is very influential on the contemporary discussions of modality, I do not think this particu-
lar view is widely accepted. Although it is plausible to say that we are occasionally mistaken when we 
think we are conceiving of something impossible, it is not widely accepted that this is always the case. 
For example, one of the things that Chalmers’s popular two-dimensional framework does is to pull apart 
two different layers/dimensions of mental content (primary vs. secondary intension). By doing so it al-
lows conceivability (possibility along the primary intension) and metaphysical possibility (possibility 
along the secondary intension) to come apart. It is conceivable that water is not H2O in Chalmers’s 
framework. See also Kung (2016: footnote 11) and Ichikawa & Jarvis (2012) about the Kripkean view 
that we cannot imagine the impossible. Furthermore, since I am granting Kung the point that we can 
imagine impossibility, I set aside Byrne’s (2007) view. This view holds that to say that p is conceivable 
just is to say that p is possible, not only because the two can come apart, but also because, presumably, I 
can coherently and meaningfully say that they come apart. 
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ing that non-sensory imagining is not a source for modal justification. As long as that indepen-
dent reason stands, we have an argument against Imaginative Conservatism. 
 Kung argues that there are three restrictions upon non-sensory imagination: (i) certainty 
about otherwise, (ii) incoherence, and (iii) imaginative resistance. For a statement S, we would 
fail to conceive that S when we’re absolutely certain that not-S, leaving us no room for imagina-
tion. And we would also fail to imagine that S when imagining that S is to imagine something 
incoherent. Finally, imagining that S is sometimes difficult when we’re, for whatever reason, 
unwilling to find S conceivable and hence experience what philosophers sometimes call imagina-
tive resistance. So, I can conceive that S as long as (i) I’m not certain that not-S, (ii) S is coherent 
with what I believe, and (iii) I’m willing to conceive that S (2010: 628-633). 
 But, according to Kung, the fulfillment of these three conditions doesn’t seem to relate us to 
modal truths. For example, on condition (i), Kung says: 
Believability just is lack of certainty. […] It would be very odd if our non-certainty 
counted as evidence of P’s possibility. […] [T]o be non-certain is to fall short of the very 
best epistemic position one can be in […]. We need positive evidence for our claims of 
possibility, but assignments don’t provide it; they merely reflect our less-than-ideal epis-
temic position. (ibid: 634) 
Kung says it would be ‘very odd’ for believability (i.e., non-certainty of some sort, according to 
Kung) to provide modal evidence. But why is it very odd? If we can’t tell what’s so odd about it, 
we can’t just assert that assignments don’t provide evidence for possibility. I take it that this is 
the supposed oddity: Non-certainty is about our less-than-ideal epistemic position and that 
doesn’t seem to be related to any modal truths. Thus, this constraint on assignments has no 
modal epistemological value. And something similar can be said about all three constraints: 
‘What this means is that none of the three constraints on imagining — certainty, conceptual, or 
conative — have any epistemic features to support assignments as evidence for possibility’ (ibid: 
636). 
 The constraints on non-imagistic imagination are not related to truths about possibility. 
That’s why Kung thinks that, if non-sensory imagination is a faculty that works as long as the 
three conditions are met, it’s too liberal a power to have anything valuable to say about modality. 
Hence, non-sensory imaginings don’t provide even prima facie justification for modal beliefs 
and, in his own words, ‘[t]he reason is that stipulations and labels [i.e. the non-sensory assign-
ments] are virtually unconstrained, and what minimal constraints there are have no modal epis-
temological value’ (Ibid: 634; my highlighting). 
 Kung’s argument isn’t just based on the claim that imagination is very liberal. He explains 
why imagination is too liberal or insufficiently constrained by appealing to the fact that the only 
three constraints on non-sensory imagination don’t seem to stand in any relevant relation with 
modal truths for the non-sensory imaginings to be a source of modal justification. That’s why 
Kung’s skeptical argument is immune to my concern about Gregory’s attempt. 
4 A Dilemma for Moderate Skepticism 
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 Comparing Gregory’s and Kung’s arguments for Type-2 moderate skepticism shows the 
need for them to explain satisfactorily why non-sensory imaginings are not just very liberal, but 
too liberal for modal epistemology. Kung argues that the way to do so is to say that the restric-
tions on non-sensory imagination don’t seem to relate our imaginings to modal truths. We have 
seen how he does this by proposing the three restrictions on non-imagistic imagining.  
 I am sure that many would have doubts about each of the three restrictions.  I am not com9 -
mitted to the truth of these three restrictions. But I am not going to challenge them either. What I 
want to focus on is Kung’s general skeptical strategy against the epistemological value of non-
sensory imaginings. It is a strategy that helps fill in the gap that Gregory’s attempt leaves open. 
The strategy begins by locating the constraints of non-sensory imaginings; then, by pointing out 
that those constraints do not relate our imaginings to modal truths, Kung appeals to the absence 
of a relation to modal truth as evidence against the epistemic relevance of those non-sensory 
imaginings. 
 The aforementioned skeptical strategy requires an assumption that is not yet explicit. Simply 
pointing out that X doesn’t seem to be restricted in a way that is related to modal truths does not 
yet show that X is not a source of modal justification, unless we assume that being restricted in 
some way that is related to modal truths is necessary for something to be a source of modal justi-
fication. But that assumption poses a dilemma for the moderate skeptic. Why doesn’t this con-
cern about non-sensory conceivings challenge the epistemic value of our sensory conceivings 
too? 
 Kung says: ‘Basic qualitative [i.e. sensory] contents are not unconstrained the way assigned 
[i.e. non-sensory] contents are, and so the foregoing concerns about assigned contents do not 
transfer to qualitative contents’ (2010: 635). But the mere fact that the sensory conceivings are 
restricted by more than the three allegedly irrelevant limitations upon non-sensory conceivings 
doesn’t make the sensory conceivings seem to be restricted in a more relevant way. 
 If the thought is that it’d be odd to say that the constraints on the non-sensory imaginings are 
evidence for modal beliefs in the sense that those constraints don’t seem to be related to modal 
truths, it is not at all clear the constraints on sensory conceivings are any better. Do the con-
straints on the intrinsic qualitative features of my sensory imaginings really seem to be related to 
the wild modal reality, e.g., the possibility of a pink flying donkey? They don’t seem any more 
related to modal truths than the constraints upon non-sensory imaginings. By parity of reasoning, 
shouldn’t Kung be more radical in his skepticism about the epistemic value of our imaginings? 
What is so special about sensory imaginings that they can avoid the problem? 
 To explain the specialness of the sensory imaginings, Gregory writes: 
Here is one way of incorporating appearance-based approaches to the imagination within 
a scheme for the justification of ascriptions of possibility. Begin with the idea that we are 
entitled to accept whatever is presented as being the case by some nondoxastic seeming 
[i.e. sensory appearance]. Next, take some occasion on which you imagine an F, with 
something’s thereby appearing to you to be the case, where the accuracy of the foregoing 
 Yablo, for example, would have a major qualm with Kung’s claim that believability is the major restric9 -
tion on non-sensory imagining.
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appearance seems very obviously to imply the possibility of Fs. Then (and assuming that 
you’re entitled to assume that the previous implication holds) you are entitled to accept 
that Fs are possible. Hence your belief was in fact justified by your initial imagining. 
(2010: 327) 
If I understand Gregory’s reasoning correctly, the thought is that evidence for actuality is evi-
dence for possibility. Sensory imageries are evidence for actuality; therefore, they are evidence 
for possibility. Sensory imaginings contain sensory imageries. That is why those imaginings are 
evidence for possibility. And this is a feature that non-sensory imaginings do not have. 
 This is an interesting suggestion, but I do not think it works. By simply visualizing a red 
tomato, do I thereby have any evidence at all that there is actually a red tomato? Of course not. 
Thus, sensory imageries alone clearly do not justify claims about actuality; only sensory im-
ageries embedded in perceptions do. Since the sensory imageries in our sensory imaginings are 
not embedded in perceptions, they are not evidence for actuality. So, surely, Gregory is right that 
evidence for actuality is also evidence for possibility. But that gives us no reason at all to think 
that sensory imaginings provide evidence for possibilities while non-sensory imaginings do not. 
 About the specialness of sensory imaginings, Kung says something that sounds similar: 
I think it is plausible that states with basic qualitative content provide evidence for possi-
bility. The basic qualitative content of perceptual experience presents a way that space 
can consistently be filled around the perceiver. When my perceptual experience presents a 
red surface to my right and a black surface to my left, we theorists can say that, as far as 
the experience presents, a red surface on the right is consistent with a black surface on the 
left. That is one way that space could be filled. (2010: 637) 
Kung appears to be making the same point as Gregory: the qualitative contents (i.e., the sensory 
imageries) provides modal justification in the case of perception, so it should provide modal jus-
tification in sensory imaginings as well. That is why sensory imaginings are special. However, 
there is a crucial difference. Kung explicitly denies in a footnote that perception of p justifies the 
possibility of p via (i) justifying the actuality of p plus (ii) the principle that actuality entails pos-
sibility: 
One way to block the intuition that qualitative contents provide evidence for possibility is 
to hold that we infer possibility from actuality; perceptual experiences furnish no evi-
dence for possibility except insofar as can be inferred from actuality. (I.e., experience 
presents space in way W; the world is such that W; whatever is actual is possible; there-
fore, way W presents space consistently.) 
It strikes me that this confuses conceptual priority with epistemic priority. It may very 
well be that the concept of truth is more fundamental than the concept of possibility, and 
possessing the former concept is a prerequisite for acquiring the latter. But it does not fol-
low that perceptual experiences cannot be a basic source of evidence for possibility. I 
think that is the more plausible view; and in fact I am inclined toward an even stronger 
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line of reasoning: perceptual experience must provide evidence for possibility for it to 
provide evidence of actuality. (ibid: 638 footnote 22) 
Kung thinks that sensory qualities provide modal justification directly — there is no inference 
from actuality to possibility involved. That makes his response immune to my objection to Ger-
gory’s response. 
 But Kung’s assertion that sensory qualities provide modal justification directly is very con-
troversial. And he offers no motivation, let alone justification, for the assertion. In particular, his 
response is not dialectically helpful in the current context, where modal skepticism is exactly the 
issue at stake. We want to know why having sensory imageries makes sensory imaginings modal 
epistemologically special, such that they can circumvent the skeptical concern for non-sensory 
imaginings. Kung’s answer is tantamount to just asserting that sensory imaginings are epistemi-
cally special.  10
 Kung is not unaware of the dialectical shortcoming of his assertion of our sensory imagin-
ings’ specialness: 
Although I think these considerations about basic qualitative content are plausible [i.e. 
that the qualitative content of sensory imaginings are not only bound by the three restric-
tions upon no-sensory imaginings], I realize they may not convince a hardened modal 
skeptic. I am engaged in what Pryor calls (with respect to external world skepticism) a 
‘modest anti-skeptical project’ (Pryor, 2000, p. 517) for modal epistemology: showing 
that by starting with premises that we find plausible—rather than only those the skeptic 
will grant us—we can defend an imagination-based modal epistemology. (2010: 638) 
 Pryor et al. think that anti-skepticism doesn’t have to be exclusively based on premises ac-
ceptable from a skeptic’s point of view. Pryor thinks that, as long as one perceives that p, one has 
prima facie justification for believing that p. We don’t need any underlying theory to justify per-
ception’s prima facie justificatory value. This allows Pryor to rationally resist falling into skepti-
cism, even if that reasoning cannot convince a skeptic in a non-question-begging manner.  11
 Kung tries to say something similar about the sensory conceivings. There’s no non-question-
begging argument against the radical skeptics who dismiss the epistemic relevance of any con-
ceiving (sensory or not). But it can be a starting point for non-skeptics to think that sensory con-
ceivings provide prima facie modal justification. And such a starting point would allow philoso-
 On a similar note, Gregory writes: ‘Those are good questions and I’ve not got answers to them. […] 10
But the queries just raised don’t undermine the claim that sensory imaginings produce appearances of 
possibility; they merely underscore how hard it is to provide a philosophically adequate description of 
what’s going on when imaginings produce such appearances’ (2010: 332). I find such kind of hand-wav-
ing remark dialectically problematic, particularly in a context where Gregory is raising an argument 
against the epistemic relevance of non-sensory imaginings.
 A similar approach in epistemology has been further developed to include not only perceptions, but 11
seemings in general (whatever they are) by Huemer (2001; 2007) in the form of Phenomenal Conser-
vatism.
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phers like Kung to rationally resist falling into radical skepticism. The underlying constraints on 
the sensory imaginings don’t seem to relate to modal facts? That’s alright. Sensory imagining is a 
source of foundational modal justification that makes things seem possible. As a source of modal 
justification, its justificatory power does not need to be further explained by its underlying con-
straints’ relation to modal facts. 
 However, I believe a double standard is at work in the way Kung uses Pryor’s approach to 
defend the epistemic relevance of sensory conceivings alone. If Pryor’s dogmatist approach 
works for defending the epistemic relevance of sensory conceivings, nothing prevents one from 
saying the same thing about conceivability in general. The skeptical worry about the non-sensory 
conceivings is basically in the same spirit as the radical skeptical worry about the sensory con-
ceivings. 
 The underlying constraints on our non-sensory imaginings don’t seem to relate to modal 
facts? That’s alright. Non-sensory imagining is also a source of foundational modal justification 
that makes things seem possible. As a source of modal justification, its justificatory power does 
not need to be further explained by its underlying constraints’ relation to modal facts. It seems 
that there is no principled way in which Kung can allow the dogmatist approach to save the sen-
sory imaginings from radical skepticism without allowing the same dogmatist approach to save 
the non-sensory imaginings from his own moderate skepticism. 
 It is certainly not logically inconsistent to treat the two kinds of imaginings differently. But 
his reason for holding the hybrid view puts him in a dialectically awkward position. As long as 
Kung doesn’t want to be skeptical about sensory imaginations for the kind of reason he offers, 
the only fair thing to do is to accept that conceivings generally provide prima facie modal justifi-
cation, i.e., to accept Imaginative Conservatism.  12
5 Radical Skeptics 
 I have argued that the general strategy for defending Type-2 moderate skepticism puts the 
advocates of Type-2 moderate skepticism in a dilemma: either give up the moderately skeptical 
argument and accept Imaginative Conservatism, or stick to the spirit of their skeptical argument 
and abandon imagination completely. There is no principled way that Kung’s argument would 
work against non-sensory imaginings without also working against sensory imaginings. There’s 
no well-motivated middle ground. Since the Type-2 skeptics don’t want to give up sensory imag-
ination, they should accept Imaginative Conservatism. 
 That might be good enough to persuade some of the Type-2 skeptics to embrace Imaginative 
Conservatism. But can they opt to give up sensory imagination instead, and be radically skeptical 
about the role of conceivings in modal epistemology? In a sense, this is what Fiocco (2007) does. 
Fiocco denies the epistemic relevance of imagination completely, which he deems too liberal to 
be epistemically relevant at all. He argues that, if we think that we can have modal knowledge at 
 It is instructive to observe that it would not be helpful simply to point out that, with all the Kripkean 12
necessary a posteriori truths around, it is easier to find non-sensory imaginings of impossibilities than to 
find sensory imaginings of impossibilities. The fact that it is easier does not mean it is too easy. Even if it 
is easier for non-sensory imaginings to get modal truths wrong, that would not explain why non-sensory 
imaginings do not provide modal justification at all.
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all, we have to follow Bealer (2002) in postulating a distinct faculty of modal intuition.  I’ll 13
complete my defense by arguing that, when it comes down to a choice between Imaginative 
Conservatism and radicalizing the skeptical argument, there’s an independent reason for picking 
Imaginative Conservatism instead of doubling down on the skeptical argument. 
 If Kung et al. want to stick to the spirit of the argument and be radical skeptics about the 
epistemic value of conceivability, the skeptical argument should be radicalized in the following 
way: [a] if imaginings (sensory or not) are not too liberal to be epistemically relevant, they 
should be restricted in a way that somehow relates us to truths about possibilities. [b] But they 
don’t seem to be restricted in such a way. Thus, we have a reason to think that, generally, con-
ceiving is too liberal to be epistemically relevant. 
 My response is this. [1] Appealing to conceivings to justify beliefs about possibility is our 
current epistemic practice. [2] We shouldn’t give up our current epistemic practice unless there’s 
strong reason to do so.  [3] The radically skeptical argument requires a hidden assumption 14
which is very controversial. [4] The controversial assumption makes the radically skeptical ar-
gument too weak to demand giving up our current epistemic practice. Thus, if we have to choose 
between Imaginative Conservatism and the radically skeptical argument, it’s more reasonable to 
choose the former. 
 Let’s examine the premises of my response. I think whatever one’s considered modal epis-
temology turns out to be, premise [1] is prima facie plausible. When I am asked whether I could 
have been taller than I actually am, how do I proceed in answering the question? I try to conceive 
of myself as being taller. I can conceive of that. For that reason, I am justified in believing that I 
could have been taller. Appealing to imagination is one of the most natural reactions people have 
to questions about possibilities.  15
 I say ‘in a sense’, because Fiocco doesn’t make the distinction between sensory and non-sensory con13 -
ceiving.
 This is why I call my main thesis Imaginative Conservatism. It should be noted that Imaginative Con14 -
servatism is neutral with respect to Huemer’s Phenomenal Conservatism, which says that seemings give 
us prima facie justification. Imaginative Conservatism remains neutral in the sense that it says nothing 
about seemings at all. As we have seen earlier, Gregory believes that if imaginings can offer modal justi-
fication at all this must be done via generating seemings of possibilities. And he believes that non-sensory 
imaginings do not generate modal seemings. In section 2, I granted Gregory the assumption and played 
along; I argued that Gregory has offered no good reason to think that non-sensory imaginings produce no 
modal seemings. So there is no reason for an advocate of Phenomenal Conservatism like Gregory to re-
ject Imaginative Conservatism. But that does not mean I am committed to the claim that imaginings pro-
vide modal justification only if they generate modal seemings. A defender of Imaginative Conservatism 
has the option to reject Phenomenal Conservatism (perhaps by denying that there are such things as seem-
ings). In fact, as the argument [1] - [4] shows, Imaginative Conservatism can be defended on the basis of 
being conservative about the standing epistemic practices, with no mentioning of seemings at all. I am 
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify the relation between my view and Phenome-
nal Conservatism.
 It has been argued that to say that p is conceivable just is to say that p is possible and that, because of 15
this, it is wrong to conclude that conceivability is evidence for possibility. But we must reject this argu-
ment provided that we, like Kung, accept that something impossible can be conceived.
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 By ‘current epistemic practice’, I don’t just mean epistemic habits that we happen to have, 
but epistemic habits that we generally find reasonable. Certainly we don’t consider all of our 
immediate reactions reasonable; but for those that we find unreasonable, we’d feel the urge to 
retract our reactions once they were brought to our attention. (This is the case, for instance, with 
a lot of our implicitly sexist or racist biases or practices.) On the contrary, an appeal to conceiv-
ing for modal justification is not the kind of immediate reaction we would ordinarily feel the 
urge to retract even when brought to our full awareness. That is why [1] seems very plausible to 
me. 
 I take premise [2] for granted. We can view [2] as a kind of epistemic conservatism, which is 
defended in slightly different forms by, just to name a few, Quine (1953), Chisholm (1980), 
Kvanvig (1989), and McCain (2008). I find [2] rather intuitive and don’t have much to add in its 
defense. But it’ll take some work to justify [3] and [4]. 
6 The Hidden Assumption and its Motivation 
 Premise [3] says that there is a hidden assumption in the radically skeptical argument. Here 
it is: 
[Truth Relating] If X is the source of epistemic justification for our belief on a subject 
matter, X must be related to the truth on that subject matter in a way that does not have to 
be characterized in terms of epistemic justification. 
The qualification ‘in a way that does not have to be characterized in terms of epistemic justifica-
tion’ is needed to avoid trivializing the relation to truth the skeptics have in mind. Without this 
qualification, Kung’s argument cannot go through, for defenders of Imaginative Conservativism 
can then say that the constraints upon our conceivings are related to modal truths because our 
conceivings provide justification for believing that certain modal claims are true. What skeptics 
like Kung are getting at is a relation to modal truths that explains justification, not one that is 
characterized in terms of justification. 
 A tacit endorsement of this necessary condition for epistemic justification is the only reason 
for one to accept the radically skeptical argument’s premise [a], namely: as long as it doesn’t 
seem that our conceivings are restricted in a way that relates appropriately to modal truths, we 
have good reason to think that our conceivings do not justify modal beliefs. 
 It is fine to say that a certain relation to truth is sufficient for epistemic justification. It is, 
however, a different thing to say that it is necessary. Given that we appeal to so many different 
things to justify our beliefs/theories (e.g., perception, testimony, parsimony, mathematical ele-
gance, moral sentiments, etc.) and not all of them are obviously truth relating, a monopolizing 
claim like Truth Relating isn’t self-evident and needs proper motivation if we want to use it to 
challenge a standing epistemic practice. Certainly one can have the theoretical aspiration to try 
to unify all kinds of epistemic justification with a necessary condition like Truth Relating (e.g., 
Kelly (2004) tries to justify appeal to parsimony in terms of its truth conduciveness), and rule out 
everything else as an illegitimate source of epistemic justification. But for the radically skeptical 
argument to demand the abandonment of one of our epistemic practices, one needs to explain 
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why there must be such a unifying necessary condition for epistemic justification. That is, Truth 
Relating had better be well-motivated.  16
 How can Truth Relating be motivated, then? As far as I can tell, the only way to motivate it 
would be to claim that epistemic value is a kind of instrumental value in the following sense: 
epistemic justification is nothing but a means or an instrument for guiding us to truth by recom-
mending that we accept certain beliefs.  If we think that there can be some other goals for epis17 -
temic justification, we have no reason to rule out the possibility that there are sources of justifi-
cation that do not relate to truth in the way that Truth Relating requires. For example, a descrip-
tive metaphysician might think that part of the goal of metaphysics is to find a theory that is ra-
tional in the sense that accepting it, in addition to being psychologically realistic for us, enriches 
our lives. (See, e.g., Strawson 1962). Such a goal does not seem to be related to truth at all. 
 To see why Truth Relating is controversial and hence why [3] is true, we need to examine 
what this instrument-for-truth conception of epistemic justification implies by taking a little de-
tour: We need to examine the concept of a good instrument. 
7 What Makes an Instrument Particularly Good? 
 We can talk about the goodness of an instrument in two ways: either with respect to a type of 
job in a type of situation, or with respect to a job token in a situation token. For example, suppose 
a zombie is running towards me, and I am wondering whether my gun is a good instrument for 
killing the zombie. There are two different questions I might be asking myself. 
 First, I might be asking whether the gun I am holding is good for zombie killing (as a type of 
job) in a certain type of circumstance where a zombie is running. Let’s call this a question about 
General Evaluation. But, secondly, I might be asking whether my gun is good for killing this 
particular zombie in this particular circumstance (not this or that type of circumstance, but this 
circumstance in particular). Let’s call this a question about Particular Evaluation. General 
Evaluation and Particular Evaluation can come apart. A lullaby can be good generally for getting 
a baby to sleep on a typical night; but that same lullaby can nevertheless be an instrument that is 
not good particularly for getting this baby to get to sleep on this night. Both evaluations (one 
positive, one negative) can be true of the lullaby as an instrument at the same time. 
 We know how to carry out a General Evaluation; all we need is to see whether an instrument 
is statistically likely to generate the desired result for a job type in the targeted situation type. For 
that reason, it’s quite clear an instrument can be good generally for a type of job in a type of sit-
uation even if that instrument doesn’t work for a particular job in a particular case, as I have il-
lustrated with the lullaby case. How about Particular Evaluation? How do we carry it out? Unlike 
 Questions about this single-minded conception of epistemic rationality have, in recent years, been 16
raised not only by those who challenge epistemic consequentialism (e.g. Berker 2013), but also by some 
virtue epistemologists (e.g., Montmarquet 1993), by philosophers defending the idea of pragmatic en-
croachment (e.g., Fantl & McGrath 2009), and by feminist metaphysicians following Haslanger’s amelio-
rative project (2000; 2006). They all, in their own way, try to explore the idea that there are factors that 
can serve as reasons for theory choice that do not involve relating us to the relevant truths.
 I could be wrong and there might be other ways to motivate Truth Relating. I don’t have an argument to 17
show that this is the only way other than that this is the only promising way I can see.
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General Evaluation, I don’t think that an instrument can be good particularly for this job in this 
situation if the instrument doesn’t work for this particular job in this particular situation. That is, 
I endorse the following: 
[Job Failed] If x fails in doing a particular job in a particular situation, x is not a good 
instrument particularly for that particular job in that particular situation. 
Whereas failing to do a particular job is not sufficient for an instrument to be evaluated as bad 
generally, failure is sufficient for the instrument to be evaluated as bad particularly. According to 
Job Failed, if I shoot this zombie in its head in this token situation and this zombie doesn’t die, 
my gun is an instrument not good particularly for this token job in this token situation — it does 
not matter what exactly about this very zombie or this very situation that causes the failure. This 
is perfectly compatible with saying that the gun is still an instrument that is good generally for a 
zombie-killing job in that kind of situation.  18
 Job Failed is motivated by the way we judge the instruments we use in everyday life. For 
example, Job Failed explains why we are inclined to say, in the lullaby case, that – if the lullaby 
fails to put this baby to sleep tonight – the lullaby is not an instrument that is good for putting 
this baby to sleep on this particular night, even though the lullaby may still be generally good for 
putting babies to sleep at night. There is absolutely no point at all for insisting that the lullaby is 
good for putting this baby to sleep on this very night given that it does not work (whatever it is 
about this baby and/or this night that explains the failure). 
 The point generalizes to the Particular Evaluations of all instruments. Hence, actual failure is 
sufficient for a bad Particular Evaluation. When we talk about the goodness of an instrument, we 
need to be clear what kind of evaluation we care about. 
8 Good Epistemic Justification as a Good Instrument for Truth 
 Back from the detour. Suppose I have a particular belief B in a particular situation S. I won-
der whether B is well justified. For the sake of argument, let’s assume that epistemic justification 
is an instrument for truth. Then, to ask whether B is well justified is to ask whether we have good 
instruments that guide us to truth by recommending B. Our discussion about instrument evalua-
tion applies. 
 Given the distinction between the General Evaluation and Particular Evaluation of an in-
strument, and given that we are to view good epistemic justification as a good instrument of 
some sort, we should now ask ourselves: When we ask whether I have good epistemic justifica-
 Note that saying that my gun is bad particularly for killing this very zombie Z does not immediately 18
imply that it is irrational for me to pick my gun to kill Z. For, in picking my gun to kill Z, I might not be 
in a position to know that my gun is particularly bad for killing Z. We need to separate the metaphysical 
issue from the epistemic issue. Job Failed is about the metaphysical issue of what constitutes the goodness 
of an instrument for a particular job in a particular situation. What is rational for one to do at a time, how-
ever, is partly an epistemic issue, depending partly on whether one knows at the time which instrument is 
really good. Sometimes, we have to act by betting on what is good generally and hope that it is also good 
particularly. But the mere fact that it is rational to bet on something to work does not make that thing ac-
tually a good instrument for the job.
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tion for B, are we really asking (i) whether I have instruments that are good generally for target-
ing truth by recommending a certain type of belief in a certain type of situation, or are we really 
asking (ii) whether I have any instrument that is good for targeting truth by recommending this 
token belief B in this token situation, right here and right now? 
 Here is a simple argument for (ii). When we are wondering whether my belief B is justified, 
our concern is primarily about the truth of the following statement: 
[a] I have justification for the belief B in this very situation S. 
We would be disappointed as long as [a] is false. Since we are assuming that justification just is 
an instrument for targeting truth, we should be allowed to substitute ‘have justification’ with 
‘have a good truth targeting instrument for’:  19
[a’] I have a good truth targeting instrument for the belief B in this very situation S. 
And what we said about [a] should apply to [a’]. So, when we inquire about the justificatory sta-
tus of my belief B, our primary concern is the truth of [a] and hence [a’]. 
 Note that to say [a’] is our primary concern is just to say that having a good truth-targeting 
instrument for this particular belief in this particular situation is our primary concern. And that 
is tantamount to saying that Particular Evaluation is our primary concern when we inquire about 
the justificatory statuses of our beliefs — assuming that justification is to be understood as a 
truth targeting instrument. Our interest in General Evaluation, on the contrary, is secondary or 
derivative. 
 It is noteworthy that this conclusion is in fact in line with how we think about ordinary in-
struments. When I want to put a nail through the wall of my office, I pick a hammer. By picking 
the hammer, my primary concern is that that hammer can put the very nail I am holding into that 
particular wall in my office. Surely I also care whether a hammer is generally a good instrument 
for putting nails in walls. But I care about that only insofar as the general goodness of a hammer 
is a hint of the fact that this hammer can put this nail through this wall. 
 As I have argued in our detour, Particular Evaluations of instruments are governed by the 
principle Job Failed. According to Job Failed, an epistemic justification for B is bad if it fails its 
particular job, namely, fails in guiding us to the truth by recommending B. That happens when B 
is false. As a result, an epistemic justification for B is bad if B is false. Generalizing this reason-
ing beyond the belief B, if Job Failed is true, then the assumption that epistemic justification is 
nothing but a truth targeting instrument implies that an epistemic justification is no good if the 
particular belief that that justification purports to support is false (i.e., if it failed at its job). Note 
that to have bad justification is to have no justification at all. So our assumption has led to the 
claim that false beliefs aren’t justified at all. Surprisingly, this is infallibilism about epistemic 
 If one resists the substitution, one basically resists the truth-targeting instrument conception of epis19 -
temic justification.
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justification.  So although Truth Relating itself does not imply infallibilism, to accept Truth Re20 -
lating not as brute but as a motivated principle, we have to accept a conception of epistemic justi-
fication that implies infallibilism. 
 Of course most people who accept Truth Relating (e.g., reliabilists) want to say that justified 
false beliefs are possible (after all, the plausibility of fallibilism is exactly the force of my argu-
ment). For example, when I hallucinate an apple on the table, most people want to say that, all 
else being equal, I am thereby justified in believing that there is an apple on the table even 
though there is no apple on the table. They can say so. I am not denying that it is consistent for 
them to assert both Truth Relating and fallibilism. But the consistency of these claims is beside 
the point. 
 What I have argued is that, although the plausibility of fallibilism may urge us to deny that 
Particular Evaluation is the standard for good justification, the truth-targeting-instrument concep-
tion of epistemic justification tacitly requires us to accept that Particular Evaluation is the prima-
ry concern for justification. If the skeptics do not want Truth Relating to be an unmotivated brute 
assertion, their only option (that I can see) is to motivate it with the truth-targeting-instrument 
conception of epistemic justification. And it is this conception of epistemic justification that, 
whether they like it or not, entails infallibilism. 
 Let’s take stock. The radicalized skeptical argument works only if we accept the hidden as-
sumption Truth Relating, which expresses a necessary condition for epistemic justification. And 
the skeptics either have to accept Truth Relating as brute, or offer some motivation for Truth Re-
lating. Since not all the things we rely on as sources of justification obviously relate to truth (e.g., 
parsimony), it is controversial whether we should accept Truth Relating as brute. This is not a 
reason to reject Truth Relating, per se. There is nothing philosophically wrong in itself in accept-
ing something controversial as brute. The problem arises, however, when we have to choose be-
tween accepting that as brute or sticking to our standing epistemic practice, and we cannot have 
both. To motivate Truth Relating, however, we need to accept the conception of epistemic justifi-
cation that it is nothing but an instrument for guiding us to truth by recommending beliefs to us. 
By arguing for a principle about instrument evaluation, I have shown that the truth targeting in-
strument conception of epistemic justification turns out to imply infallibilism,  which is, to say 21
 See Maitzen (1995) and Pollock (2004) for an argument in a similar spirit. This kind of argument is, as 20
Maitzen points out, analogous to the argument against rule utilitarianism that it either turns into some 
form of rule worshipping or collapses into act utilitarianism. My argument, however, does not purport to 
challenge externalism as, e.g., Pollock (2004) does. I only question the motivation for accepting Truth-
Relating as a necessary condition for epistemic justification; it may still be reasonable to consider certain 
externalist relations to truth to be sufficient conditions for epistemic justification and, hence, externalism 
could still be well motivated.
 As Maitzen (1995) points out, this observation (mis-)leads some philosophers to think that all it takes to 21
have knowledge is to have true beliefs — justification is redundant. Going on a slightly different route, 
Steglich-Petersen (2009) defends the truth-aiming conception of epistemic justification by embracing in-
fallibilism (see also, Littlejohn (2012) who argues that when a belief is false the best we have is an epis-
temic excuse from epistemic blame, not justification; and the intuition against infallibilism is based on 
confusing excuse and justification). It is also interesting to note that, defending infallibilism of perceptual 
justification, instead of eschewing justification, McDowell (2011) is led to think that all it takes to have 
perceptual knowledge is justified belief — truth is redundant.
  !18
the least, extremely controversial. So, accepting Truth Relating is a controversial move no matter 
what; and that’s why premises [3] and [4] are true. Since a crucial premise of the radically skep-
tical argument needs but lacks proper motivation, it’s more reasonable to choose Imaginative 
Conservatism instead of doubling down on the skeptical argument to its radical end. 
9 An Objection from Naturalism? 
 My response to the radical skeptics in section 6 - 8 has a significance for conceivability-
based modal epistemology that goes beyond simply urging the moderate skeptics to resist the 
temptation to go radical. It also serves as a principled answer to what Yablo calls ‘the objection 
from naturalism’ against conceivability-based modal epistemology (1993: 3-4). According to the 
objection, appealing to conceivings cannot provide modal justification because conceivings are 
causally isolated from the relevant modal facts.  22
 Instead of answering the objection head on, Yablo simply responds by gesturing at our 
mathematical knowledge — which is supposed to have a subject matter to which we have epis-
temic access despite our being causally isolated from it. But such a gesture is dialectically weak. 
After all, it is not as if people generally think that such an objection does not apply to mathemat-
ical knowledge. Quite the contrary, something similar to the objection from naturalism manifests 
itself as the famous Integration Challenge in the context of mathematical knowledge (Benaceraff 
1973). 
 Note that the objection assumes that, if conceivings are epistemologically relevant, there 
must be a causal relation between our conceivings and the modal facts. Let’s call this the Natu-
ralistic Assumption. 
 If Truth Relating requires motivation, so does the Naturalistic Assumption. That is because 
the Naturalistic Assumption is in fact a restricted version of Truth Relating. Whereas Truth Relat-
ing says that some relation to modal truth is a necessary condition for modal justification, the 
Naturalistic Assumption says more specifically that a causal relation to modal truth is a neces-
sary condition for modal justification. An analogy might help: If we need proper motivation for 
thinking that there are some unicorns in the universe, then we need proper motivation for think-
ing that there are some unicorns in USA specifically. If we aren’t even motivated to accept the 
former, we most certainly aren’t motivated to accept the latter. Therefore, if Truth Relating is not 
well motivated, neither is the Naturalistic Assumption. 
 Hence, my counterargument against the radically skeptical argument gives us the resources 
to resist the objection from naturalism as well: appealing to conceivings generally (sensory or 
not) for modal justification is part of our current epistemic practice, which should not be aban-
doned without good reason; the objection from naturalism is based on a premise that requires but 
lacks proper motivation unless we endorse the truth targeting instrument conception of epistemic 
justification, which implies the controversial infallibilism; therefore, the objection is not good 
enough to challenge the general appeal to conceivings for modal justification. The reasonable 
course to take is still to accept Imaginative Conservatism. 
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